Hunger for Export: Food Rationing in Ceaușescu's Romania

A long queue of people in winter coats, some with bicycles and shopping bags, along the front of a concrete apartment block in Bucharest
Waiting in line for cooking oil at Bucur Obor, Bucharest, 1986. Photo: Scott Edelman, from the Library of Congress country study Romania (1989). Public domain. Source.

In 1981 communist Romania brought back food rationing for the first time since 1953, and it stayed in force for the rest of the decade (Library of Congress country study). The cause was not war or drought but a political decision: Nicolae Ceaușescu resolved to pay off Romania’s entire foreign debt, and the regime “exported as much as possible” to do it (Library of Congress). Romanians paid with ration cards, unheated flats and empty shops. When Ceaușescu announced in April 1989 that the debt was gone, nothing improved — and by the end of the year his regime had fallen.

From debt to austerity

In the 1970s Ceaușescu had financed rapid industrialization with Western loans. When the price of oil and development finance rose abruptly in 1979, the debt became unsustainable. Rather than reform, the regime chose to pay the debt off through austerity, import substitution and the export-led accumulation of dollar reserves — a policy that, the political economist Cornel Ban writes, brought “dramatically compressed consumption” (Ban, 2012).

Agriculture had been neglected in favour of ever more ambitious industrial programmes, as a Western correspondent observed in 1981 (Bourne, CSM 1981). Romania, once an exporter of grain and oil, was now importing both.

Rationing returns, 1981–1982

In October 1981 people in Romania’s cities and towns were limited to about one pound (450 grams) of bread a day; some bakers asked customers for identity cards to prove they lived in town. Most of the rural population, tied to the state collective farms, was left outside the rationing system altogether (Bourne, CSM 1981). By August 1982 meat and other basic foods were “rationed even more strictly here than in Poland,” and the prices of some 220 food items had risen by an average of 35 percent (Bourne, CSM 1982).

The regime presented scarcity as science. On 3 July 1982 the party’s Political Executive Committee approved a draft “Programme of Scientific Nutrition of the Population”, drawn up “at the initiative and under the direct guidance” of Ceaușescu. According to the party newspaper Scînteia, it set out “what it is normal to consume” for each citizen according to age, sex and work, and required every county, town and commune to supply its own food under the principle of “self-supply” (Scînteia, 4 July 1982).

A self-sufficiency that fed exports

The Library of Congress study, completed in July 1989, described how the system worked in practice. Under the party’s self-sufficiency programme each village and county had to produce as much of its own food as possible, but “in reality the program was another means for procuring agricultural products for export”: nearly all the production from the three types of farms “was confiscated by state procurement agencies.” In 1985 the average citizen was entitled to 54.88 kilograms of meat and fish, 1.1 kilograms of margarine and 114 eggs a year — yet most Romanians “were unable to obtain even these scant rations.” Romania’s statistical yearbooks simply stopped reporting food consumption (Library of Congress).

A reporter in Bucharest in 1986 found sugar, flour and cooking oil rationed and meat “nearly impossible to find.” The best products were exported: “While Romanians queue in front of empty butcher shops, American soldiers in West Germany eat Romanian meat” (Echikson, CSM 1986).

Cold and dark

Energy was rationed too. In the winter of 1984–85 — the harshest most Romanians could remember — street lamps and even traffic lights were switched off. “There is no water, no heating or gas in most apartments, no question of bath, and no cooking,” a Western diplomat said; people wore coats indoors because there was no communal heating and electric heaters were forbidden, and the queues outside shops were no shorter; townspeople waited for hours in the open in freezing temperatures (Bourne, CSM 1985). The next winter, buildings were heated to no more than 64°F (18°C) and apartments lit with bulbs of no more than 60 watts (Echikson, CSM 1986).

“A looming famine”

By 1987 the situation was alarming even to the regime. In October 1987 a CIA information report stated that officials in Bucharest regarded the food shortages as “almost catastrophic” and were considering a formal state of emergency; some spoke openly of “a looming famine.” There were almost no food reserves anywhere in the country, and the population’s allotments were to be cut further (FRUS 1981–1988, vol. X, doc. 165).

Ceaușescu insisted the opposite. In November 1988 he claimed that Romanians ate 3,200 calories a day, which he called excessive (Library of Congress).

The debt is paid; the shops stay empty

On 31 March 1989 Ceaușescu told the party’s Political Executive Committee that the debt had been repaid; the news was announced at a party plenum on 12 April and published the next day. In 1980, he said, the debt had stood at “over 11 billion dollars”: “From 1975 till March 1989 we paid about 21 billion dollars, of which the interest represents over 7 billion dollars.” Paying it had “undoubtedly required great sacrifices” (Moisa and Moisa, 2018).

The Securitate’s own files show that nothing changed. The historians Gabriel and Corina Moisa examined its reports from Bihor County in western Romania. In May 1989 only 38 percent of the planned milk was being collected; eggs on sale covered about 30 percent of the population’s needs; kindergartens received milk according to what arrived, not the number of children. In November 1989 the Securitate recorded the deliveries to the town of Marghita (Moisa and Moisa):

Marghita, 1989 Allocated Delivered
Meat, October 18 tons 4.7 tons
Meat, November 40 tons 4.1 tons
Canned meat, October 13 tons 0 tons

People complained, the Securitate reported, that “after such a rich harvest, flour is rationed and not distributed monthly.” Meanwhile, at the 14th Party Congress on 20 November 1989, Ceaușescu claimed that food consumption had risen to “about 3,300 calories” a day (Moisa and Moisa). A month later the regime was overthrown. By the time the debt was paid off, Ban concludes, the regime’s economic legitimacy was largely gone (Ban).

Why it matters

Romania in the 1980s had not suffered war or natural disaster. Its people went hungry and cold because one man decided that debt repayment mattered more than their living standards, and because no institution, election or free press could stop him. The regime called rationing “scientific nutrition,” exported meat while its citizens queued at empty butcher shops, and announced record calorie intake as its own secret police reported empty shops. This is what a planned economy without accountability does when its rulers’ priorities differ from the needs of the people they rule.

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